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A B S T R A C T
This article problematizes the juxtaposition of place and identity. By analyzing different dimensions of land-
scape, it asks how an ethnically diverse neighborhood in Chengdu, China, has become considered a Tibetan
place. The article engages with and pushes John Brinckerhoff Jackson's distinction between political and ver-
nacular landscapes, introducing a third category: the commercial landscape. Each of these three dimensions of
the landscape, which are deeply entangled but conceptually distinct, transforms multi-ethnic space into a
Tibetan place. The vernacular emerges from the traces of quotidian life in the form of languages, bodily prac-
tices, sights, scents, and colors: it ‘feels’ Tibetan. The political relates to the securitization of Tibetan spaces and
how people re-imagine the traces of state-led spatial management and organization. Finally, the commercial has
to do with the appropriation of Tibetan aesthetics in the pursuit of profiting from a Tibetan Buddhist identity. I
argue that these three different landscapes are what enable us to recognize a multi-ethnic space as a Tibetan
place.
1. Introduction
The illustrations on postcards from Tibetan places will frequently be
of two types: a stunning rural scenery from “the roof of the world” with
few if any traces of human presence; and a human-made Buddhist and
pastoralist landscape that has emerged from the activities of a people
with strong religious convictions – complete with Buddhist material
culture, rituals, and maroon-clad monks. These ideal Tibetan land-
scapes are vital to Western imaginations about Shangri-la (Bishop,
1989) and Chinese spiritual longing (Ying, 2014). As individuals, we
read landscapes differently. Yet, through shared expectations and
imaginations of Tibet most of us will recognize certain landscapes, in-
cluding those appearing on the postcards, as Tibetan. However, Tibetan
people are not immobile properties of these landscapes, rooted like the
mountains and grasslands. They move and create new landscapes by
using and occupying them.
In Chengdu, the bustling capital of Sichuan province and one of
China’s migrant-attractive cities, one can find a Tibetan landscape made
up of the material traces left behind by the people who live and do
business there. The neighborhood is a multi-ethnic location, yet it has a
Tibetan atmosphere. Chinese and Tibetans alike perceive it as
Chengdu’s Tibetan quarter. Chinese colleagues call it “Little Lhasa”
(Chi: xiao Lasa) (Xue, 2009: 41) after the Tibetan capital, and “the
Barkhor Street of Chengdu” (Chi: Chengdu de bakuojie) after Lhasa’s
famous pilgrimage site (Feng, 2005: 104), marking the Tibetan quarter
in Chengdu as a proxy for the sacred Buddhist center of Tibet. My Ti-
betan interlocutors in Chengdu call it Wuhouci, the name of a nearby
Chinese temple complex dedicated to the memorialization of Zhuge
Liang (181–234), the regent of the Shuhan state. This name and its
referent are not Tibetan, perhaps indexing the awareness among Tibe-
tans that this quarter is – unlike Lhasa – situated in a Chinese city. It is
next to another attractive tourist site: the entertainment area Jin Li,
replete with multi-ethnic shopping and dining – and a Starbucks. Yet, as
this article will show, Tibetans also see and experience the quarter as a
“Tibetan place.” The Tibetan quarter anno 2019 was built upon the
structure of two intersecting streets, Wuhouci Bystreet and Ximian Qiao
Bystreet/East Wuhouci Street. Shops and spacious pavements line these
streets, but tucked away behind or above the commercial storefronts
and in the neighboring roads are residential areas, offices, and educa-
tion centers, the most important being the Southwest University of
Nationalities. In the evening, small businesses pop up on the sidewalks.
Little Lhasa constitutes a significant spot on the Chengdu map as a
tourist site and a vibrant commercial area especially renowned for its
trade in Buddhist material culture, which attracts Tibetan and Han
Chinese merchants and customers, Buddhist devotees, and voyeurs of
Tibetan culture.
The creation of a Tibetan place in the Chinese metropolis of
Chengdu is fascinating since Tibetans are considered a highly politically
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sensitive ethnic group in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The
central and western Tibetan regions that had been under the authority
of the Dalai Lamas (known as Utsang in Tibetan) were incorporated into
the PRC in 1951 and defined by the Chinese state as the Tibet
Autonomous Region (TAR). However, Tibetans inhabited a much vaster
area, which we can refer to as ‘ethnographic Tibet.’ This included the
indigenous Tibetan regions of Kham (eastern Tibet) and Amdo (north-
eastern Tibet), which were integrated into Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan,
and Yunnan provinces. Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949,
Tibetans have resisted Beijing’s overlordship through various means,
including: attempts at international diplomacy (late 1940s/early
1950s), armed resistance and rebellion (1950s), CIA-assisted guerrilla
warfare (1956–1974), a democratic government-in-exile (since 1960),
and largely non-violent protest (particularly in the 1980s). More re-
cently, a wave of 125 Tibetan protests that erupted in March 2008 and
155 self-immolations (February 2009 to February 2019) have been
particularly troublesome to the Chinese Party-State which interprets
them as outbursts of local nationalism threatening the territorial in-
tegrity of the PRC.1 Yet, concurrent with rising political tension in Ti-
betan areas, Tibetan Buddhism has become increasingly popular among
Han Chinese (Caple, 2019, Caple, forthcoming). In response to a per-
ceived “spiritual crisis” in China, Chinese who are yearning for religious
experiences have turned to the Tibetan landscape (Ying, 2014) and the
spiritual specialists that they identify among Tibetans (Smyer Yü,
2011). In short, the Tibetan quarter in Chengdu, which prominently
displays Tibetan and Buddhist identities, has emerged in a highly-
charged constellation of security concerns, Tibetan nationalism, and the
revival and spread of Tibetan Buddhism. How has this ethnically di-
verse neighborhood become considered by its visitors as a mono-ethnic
Tibetan place? How is it defined and delimitated in an otherwise Chi-
nese urban landscape? What can the materiality of this landscape tell us
about the ways in which the Tibetan identity of this place is claimed
and contested?
I base my inquiry upon John Brinckerhoff Jackson’s distinction
between two different but complementary dimensions of landscapes,
the political and the vernacular: “… one established and maintained
and governed by law and political institutions, dedicated to perma-
nence and planned evolution; the other, the vernacular landscape,
identified with local custom, pragmatic adaptation to circumstances,
and unpredictable mobility.” (Jackson, 1984: xii). The political land-
scape is recognizable through traces of the management and organi-
zation of space that has been designed and planned to be used by
specific people in specific ways. The concept of vernacular landscape
privileges the material traces of people’s community-building activities:
the unstable, irregularly shaped landscape lying underneath the sym-
bols of permanent political power, and whose character, ownership and
dimensions are endlessly being transformed (Jackson, 1984: 150). This
article reveals the deep entanglement of the vernacular and political
dimensions of the landscape. Moreover, it argues that the ensuing
commercialization of Little Lhasa suggests the emergence of another
noticeable dimension. Therefore, I expand on Jackson’s con-
ceptualization of landscape by suggesting a third category, the com-
mercial landscape, which is dedicated to the pursuit of profit through
the appropriation of the Tibetan Buddhist aesthetics and identity that
lend commodities their value. In each of these three senses, landscape
defines a Tibetan place. Although I will highlight them individually in
three separate readings, it is important to note that they are, in reality,
deeply entangled.
Landscapes are experienced by viewing and walking through them
(Ingold and Vergunst, 2008). This is the main method applied here: I
have walked around the Tibetan quarter during numerous visits be-
tween 2010 and 2019. I have observed life there, interacting with
shopkeepers and customers in shops and tea houses; photographed and
filmed the storefronts, the commodities for sale, and the people and
their transactions; and conducted a survey of 472 businesses there
(Brox, 2017). In this article, I walk the reader through the neighbor-
hood and point to various ways in which Tibetan ethnicity and re-
ligiosity forcefully penetrate the political landscape. Hence, this article
highlights the agency of those who are often regarded as marginalized
people – marginalized where they are considered to belong and mar-
ginalized when they move – by highlighting how they have been able to
create a place of their own that is identified as Tibetan.
2. The making of landscapes in urban China
As discussed by scholars such as Gupta and Ferguson (1997), place
and identity have a special relationship: place-making inevitably in-
volves the construction of difference that is always contested, imagine,
enforced, uncertain and unstable. The meaning and demarcation of a
place is never pre-determined but is constantly constructed and con-
tested through processes that set it apart, not only as different from but
also as opposed to other places (Gupta and Ferguson, 1997: 13). I am
interested in landscape as that which enables us to identify a complex,
multi-ethnic space as a Tibetan place – just by taking a looking at it.
When we think of landscapes, we commonly think of the scenery
that can be viewed when looking from a distance and a certain vantage
point: the landscape is a “portion of the earth’s surface that can be
comprehended at a glance” (Jackson, 1984: 8). However, there is
scholarly disagreement about the proximity and distance of this gaze: is
landscape that which we experience when looking at it from afar as an
outsider or that which we experience as an insider who lives in it? Tim
Cresswell (2015: 17) summarizes this by distinguishing between ‘place’
and ‘landscape:’ Unlike place, which is difficult to get a sense of without
doing it or experiencing it from the inside, landscapes are those
meaningful locations that we think we understand just by looking at
them. The landscape that I am interested in, which at a glance can be
comprehended as Tibetan, is a landscape of the urban kind to which
people attach different meanings. I am inspired by the work of Jackson,
who argues that the landscape that we look at is never a natural scenery
that merely serves as a backdrop for people’s performances:
Whatever its shape or size it is never simply a natural space, a feature
of the natural environment; it is always artificial, always synthetic,
always subject to sudden or unpredictable change. We create them
and need them because every landscape is the place where we es-
tablish our own human organization of space and time.
Jackson, 1984: 156
Jackson points to the shifting meanings of landscape across time and
space, and how it has been used differently by different people. My
understanding of the term is grounded in its etymological roots, as
traced by Jackson (1984, 1996, 1997). Historically, the first syllable of
the compound, land, designated a space defined and delimitated by
people, and the second syllable, scape, designated the collective reality
of this space. The second syllable means “to shape,” so etymologically,
landscape means land that has been shaped by people (Ingold, 2012:
198, Olwig, 2008: 82). A landscape emerges from the activities of the
people who live there (whether plowing the land or setting up shops),
how they make themselves at home in it, or how they come to belong to
the land. To be more precise, the landscape constitutes the imprints
made by a group of people. It is the product of a community.
The particular landscape giving a downtown neighborhood in
Chengdu a Tibetan identity is the byproduct of the activities going on in
the neighborhood: how people have lived and organized their lives, the
commercial activities that have evolved, and other traces from com-
munity-building. It is a product of Tibetans’ need for a meeting-place in
urban China where they can make exchanges and transactions; their
wish to congregate with kindred spirits; their need to rest before con-
tinuing their travels; and their motivation to find a job and earn money.
1 See for instance the special issues of China Perspectives 2009 (3), Cultural
Anthropology 2012 (April), and Revue d'Etudes Tibétaines 2012 (December).
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In other words, the landscape evolved out of the needs and desires of
mobile Tibetans and their practical arrangements at this particular spot.
As Jackson (1984: 12) argues, the landscape is the product of groups
doing activities in order to form a community, not in order to form
landscapes: “…the landscape as its visible manifestation is simply the
by-product of people working and living.”
Situated just east of the Tibetan plateau, Chengdu is a gateway city
for Tibetans and Chinese. Tibetans were attracted to this particular
neighborhood in the city with the establishment of the Southwest
University of Nationalities (where minority cadres and intellectuals
were educated) in 1950, and other institutions such as a hospital,
government offices, and boarding for Tibetans in the same small area.
The growth of a Tibetan commercial zone and residential area ac-
celerated in the wake of the reforms following Mao Zedong’s death in
1976. During the 1980s, these resulted in increased leniency toward
religious belief, movement, and making money, opening up a space for
Tibetans to create their market in Chengdu and, over three decades, to
transform it into a center for trading Tibetan goods and Buddhist
commodities.2 The Tibetan neighborhood continues to attract Tibetans
who stay temporarily, seasonally, or permanently, including both the
privileged Tibetan who moves there because he is following his dreams
and can afford it and the underprivileged moving to escape margin-
alization. The Tibetan quarter will often be the first port of call for
Tibetans traveling from eastern Tibet to inland China. It is where they
can find the accommodation, shops, and information that they need
(Fig. 1). Tibetans keep coming to this particular area of Chengdu to do
their business, look for a job, beg for money, go to the hospital, get an
education, do their banking, and go shopping. This movement makes
the boundaries of the Tibetan quarter wax and wane and continuously
transforms the landscape.
Tibetans who are creating community and thus also landscape in
Chengdu – outside of the place where they are considered to belong,
namely Tibet – are not restlessly drifting in and out of the city, but are
pushed or driven there with the aim of improving their lives. Chengdu
is an attractive city for young Tibetan students and entrepreneurs
(Washul, 2018), but also an older generation of retired TAR-cadres who
buy second-home apartments there (Xu et al. 2018). Like other mi-
grants in China, Tibetans typically benefit from their ethnic, kinship,
and native-place networks and connections when they come to the city.
Solinger (1999: 249ff) writes about the power of co-provincial colonies
in China that, like the Tibetan quarter in Chengdu, were products of
chain migration and providers of work and lodging to new arrivals. The
most advanced were akin to ethnic enclaves, with organized mutual aid
and economic cooperation, community services, and welfare schemes
(Solinger, 1999). At least some of these colonies likely started as
“vernacular communities” similar to those described by Jackson in the
American context (1984: 156):
This is the kind of new community that we are seeing all over
America: at remote construction sites, in recreation areas, in trailer
courts, in the shanty towns of wetbacks and migrant workers; the
emergence of what we may call vernacular communities – without
political status, without plan, ruled by informal custom, often in-
genious adaptations to an unlikely site and makeshift materials,
destined to last no more than a year or two, and working as well as
most communities do. They would be better and last longer if they
were properly designed and serviced. They could acquire dignity if
the political landscape made a gesture of recognition. Yet very little
is needed to give those new communities a true identity; a reminder,
a symbol of permanence to indicate that they too have a history
ahead of them.
A promise of permanence was given to the Tibetan quarter when
it was named on the city map as an ethnic market and neighborhood
(Brox, 2017). With this gesture, it was recognized as a place with a
particular identity. In brochures and advertisements aimed at at-
tracting tourists to Chengdu and guiding them towards places that
could be named on a map and portrayed in a guide, the Tibetan
market was a sight worth visiting. The category of Tibetan ethnicity
was impregnated in the name, in the map, and in the brochure. Yet,
the political landscape did not make any further ‘gesture of re-
cognition’ by adding Tibetan place names, language, and particular
ethnic markers in its organization of the quarter. China has a system
of autonomy in places with high numbers and density of minority
groups, which today amounts to more than 1300 ostensibly self-
governing units across three levels: regions, prefectures, and coun-
ties (Leibold, 2013: 7). Nevertheless, the recognition of political
territory that theoretically comes with self-governance – and mate-
rially manifests itself in markers such as bi-lingual road and street
signs – does not include native-place residential groups in urban
China, such as the Tibetans congregating in downtown Chengdu. In
the words of Uradyn Bulag (2002: 202): “Cities are not supposed to
be ethnic, or autonomous…” Despite this, the Tibetan quarter is still
a place dominated by Tibetans and serving as a proxy for a Tibetan
home. In his study of the city of Xining, Andrew Grant (2018: 1459)
shows how Tibetans have channeled their efforts in ascribing and
appropriating urban space with new meanings, i.e., creating Tibetan
places: “Even without the collusion of ethnicity and politico-legal
territory, everyday practices including public rituals, religious ac-
tivities, and other bodily acts can spatialize ethnicity…”. We can
thus see the political and the vernacular tangled up as constant re-
minders that the downtown neighborhood is a place dominated by
Tibetans, but regulated and managed by the Chinese State. However,
as I will show, the ways in which the regulation unfolds in this place
actually reinforce its “Tibetan-ness.” The task, therefore, is to in-
vestigate how social and cultural meaning is attached to this urban
location, the people inhabiting it, and the activities that are taking
place there – interpreting how each of these three senses (the ver-
nacular, political, and commercial) designates a Tibetan place.
Before we turn to read the vernacular, political, and commercial
landscapes, we must remind ourselves that it is a multi-ethnic and
polyglot location. The Tibetan area is very small in geographic extent: it
stretches over only a few blocks. Tibetans share this space with other
people who identify with other ethnicities and who leave their own
material traces, contributing to the vernacular landscape in ways that
might reinforce or contest its Tibetan ownership. Forty-four recognized
ethnic groups dwell in Wuhou district where the Tibetan quarter is si-
tuated (Feng, 2005). If we disregard the majority (Han Chinese), the
Fig. 1. Tibetan accommodation. The Tibetan letters sprayed in red on the worn-
down gate offer lodging: “mgron-khang yod” (“Accommodation available”).
2 For a more detailed discussion of the historically situated Tibetan appro-
priation of the urban landscape, see Brox (2016, 2017).
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largest ethnic group is the Tibetan,3 and Mandarin and Tibetan are the
most common languages that one will hear. In a few shops, the shop-
keepers only speak Tibetan dialects, and in other shops, Han-Chinese
shop clerks have learned to speak Tibetan because of the high numbers
of Tibetan customers. Although this is a pragmatic choice, it also has a
symbolic force contributing to the apparent Tibetan-ness of this place. It
and other material manifestations of language in public space can be
used to “index identity and present a certain image of self…” (Leeman
and Modan, 2009: 336). Given the important role of linguistic en-
vironment in all three dimensions of the landscape, I draw on linguistic
landscape research (LL-research) in my reading of each. As will be clear
from the following, landscapes enable us to recognize Tibetan identity
but also its contestation where, for instance, signage and storefronts
show how languages compete on behalf of people and politics (see
Fig. 2).
3. Reading landscapes
Our reading of a landscape is based on previous experiences and
expectations. My own experience stems from time spent in Tibetan
communities in Central and East Tibet, as well as India and the
Kathmandu valley in Nepal. I have seen how one of the most iconic
Tibetan places, the Barkhor in Lhasa (both a major pilgrimage site and a
historical marketplace), is busy with commercial and religious activ-
ities. I have also lived in Tibetan settlements in India that are pockets of
Tibetan life in an otherwise non-Tibetan environment: entering the
gates of Majnukatilla in Delhi, Dekyiling in Dehradun, or Lugsam in
Karnataka, it was obvious where the limits of the Tibetan settlements
were. The Tibetan quarter in Chengdu, in contrast, does not have a gate
with a welcome sign or an arch signaling the boundary between a
Chinese downtown and Little Lhasa. In that way, it is not a clearly
demarcated Tibetan enclosure set apart from an otherwise Han-Chinese
city. The Tibetan quarter just consists of shops and residences situated
in ordinary streets that for some visitors might be indistinguishable
from the rest of Chengdu. A visitor might not know exactly when she is
inside or outside the Tibetan neighborhood. Is it even a neighborhood?
Is it Tibetan? Can it be treated as separate from its Chinese surround-
ings?
Little Lhasa, then, is both a real and imagined place. It is an ima-
gined place for visitors expecting to see archetypical Tibetans (the
monk and the nomad) and stereotypical markers of a Tibetan collective
identity. A visitor might expect maroon robes and Tibetan fur coats, or
rosy-cheeked women with long braided hair and long-sleeved dresses,
singing, dancing, and expressing their longings for the grassland. She
might expect special foodstuffs like butter tea and yak cheese. Another
visitor might expect to hear the sound of Tibetan chanting and the sight
of smiling and bespectacled Buddhist masters, religious symbols, calmly
abiding Buddhas, prayer flags fluttering in the wind, and prayer wheels
and prayer beads. Such imaginings of Tibet also materialize in China’s
commercial strips, museums, theme parks, and villages elsewhere.4 The
Tibetan vernacular expressed in Chengdu’s Tibetan quarter includes
many components of an imagined Tibet, but it also lacks signs of Ti-
betan-ness that characterized the Tibetan places that I have experienced
in India, Nepal, and Tibet. Although the most salient feature of the
neighborhood distinguishing it from the rest of the city is its over-
arching Buddhist theme, key sensory and bodily markers of Tibetan
religious space were missing, such as the smell of rancid butter from
butter lamps lit in front of an icon or the murmur of mantras by a
continuous flow of pedestrians circumambulating a holy monument.
This makes it significantly different from the Barkhor in Lhasa or the
Tibetan enclaves in India and Nepal. The facades of Little Lhasa
showing from the street are storefronts – so from the look of it, the
Tibetan quarter in Chengdu is first and foremost a commercial strip.
Yet, as I show in this article, this commercial landscape depends upon
the creation of a Tibetan landscape in both its vernacular and political
dimensions. The following three sections unpack three deeply en-
tangled dimensions of the landscape that, for the purpose of analysis,
are highlighted individually in three separate readings.
3.1. The vernacular landscape
Tibetans in downtown Chengdu have produced the vernacular
landscape in a myriad of ways that establish Tibetan ownership and
confirm its “ethnic authenticity.”5 The Tibetan markers that set this
neighborhood apart from the rest of the city as a Tibetan place are
everywhere. When we walk these streets, we first notice that there is an
extraordinarily high concentration of visibly Tibetan people. Although
some men wear their hair short and dress like any Chinese, we see
others with long hair, wearing traditional Tibetan clothes (Tib.: phyu-
pa). Some are lay pilgrims; others are there to shop or visit family.
There are women sporting wide-brimmed hats and women’s phyu-pa,
perhaps with rosy cheeks as if they have just come down from the Ti-
betan plateau. Monks and nuns, instantly recognizable swathed in their
maroon robes, are out shopping – or you might see them blessing a shop
clerk’s goods, reciting prayers for a customer, or performing some other
religious service. Here also come touring Tibetan Buddhist masters
passing by on their way home from their visits to devotees in Beijing,
Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. You see Tibetan nomads chitchatting
in the teahouses; grandmothers of Tibetan children attending school in
Chengdu; Tibetan businessmen from Lhasa replenishing their in-
ventories; and Han Chinese Buddhists shopping for religious
Fig. 2. A multi-ethnic neighborhood. Halal meat is advertised using Arabic,
Chinese, and Roman letters on the small, turquoise sign. The staircase wedged
between the two shops leads to Lhasa-Chamdo Mgron-khang, one of the nu-
merous hostels in the quarter.
3 Of Chengdu’s 14.0476 million residents, only 32,332 Tibetans were regis-
tered in the 2010 census (DERAC, 2011), but the actual number of Tibetans
living in Chengdu is as much as ten times greater (Brox, 2017). Tibetans in
Chengdu and Xining usually do not register as urban residents, even if they
have lived in the city for a long time (Brox, 2017, Washul, 2018: 501, Grant,
2018: 1462). They reside in several neighborhoods of Chengdu, but Little Lhasa
has earned the status of being the Tibetan quarter.
4 See Bishop (1989), Brauen (2004), and Lopez (1998) for Western imagin-
ings, and Smyer Yü (2015), Yeh and Coggins (2014), Zhu and Qian (2015) for
Chinese imaginings.
5 I use the term “ownership” to connote the domination of or feeling of being
at home in a place by a particular group (in this case Tibetans), rather than in
the Euro-American legal sense. According to my interlocutors, most Tibetans
rent their slots in these commercial buildings from either Han-Chinese or the
Southwest University of Nationalities.
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paraphernalia. Once in a while, you might bump into a couple of for-
eign tourists browsing a curio shop for souvenirs; more often you will
encounter some of the increasingly numerous Buddhist devotees and
Chinese voyeurs of ethnic culture who have been taken there by tour
operators to experience a little piece of Tibet outside of Tibet. You
might also come across Tibetan urbanites living elsewhere in Chengdu
who occasionally visit the market when they miss their yul (“home”) or
pha-yul (“fatherland”).6 Diki, a 32-year-old woman training to become a
teacher, related that she often went there: “Sometimes [I go] just to buy
the stuff that I need. Sometimes when I miss home. I go there to meet
Tibetans, listen to Tibetan music, see Tibetan fashion.”7
Tibetan-ness is not only represented by the people frequenting the
streets; it is also embodied and performed, for example, in eating habits.
Apart from a few Muslim noodle stalls also patronized by Tibetans, the
market is packed with places to eat Tibetan style. In 2010, 74 out of the
market’s 472 enterprises dealt with food and drinks, the majority being
teahouses and restaurants (Brox, 2017). These included low-key tea-
stalls with a couple of tables and chairs on the pavement for guests to
play the Chinese board game mahjong and more intimate restaurants
without menus, serving a crowd of Tibetans. There were also large,
multi-floor restaurants with trilingual menus in English, Chinese, and
Tibetan. A few shops sold butter and instant butter tea, yak milk, and
beef products branded as Tibetan. There were a couple of Chinese
franchise groceries like Hongqi Chain and Wowo, but none of the in-
ternational franchise consumer outlets like Starbucks or McDonald’s
that attract an upper-end clientele in China. Compared to other im-
migrant neighborhoods in global cities, which are often connected with
poverty, this is perhaps to be expected. Yet, the Tibetan quarter of
Chengdu is a zone displaying socio-economic differentiation.
There are poor people: the destitute elder pleading fellow Tibetans
for help while reciting mantras; the crippled Chinese begging among
generous Buddhists; the female peddler squatting on the sidewalk with
a baby on her arm; and the group of ragged, young Tibetan men,
dominating a street corner with loud behavior. Amid this display of
poverty are rich people: the Chinese businessman strutting about with a
lady on one arm and his money bag on the other; the charismatic
Buddhist teacher with his entourage of monks and middle-aged, female,
Chinese patrons; and the successful Tibetan entrepreneur possessing
cash and connections. They undeniably have disparate means and
methods to create landscapes. The Tibetan quarter is not a unitary
enclave since there are substantial differences between people. Poverty
and prosperity exist side by side, and these wealth disparities create
contesting vernacular landscapes. Humble dorms and hostels offered to
Tibetans coming to the neighborhood and their accompanying signs of
lower status are in sharp contrast to the gentrified façades and wealth
displayed in, for example, the fancy Golden Lemon Hotel and Shufeng
Garden Hotel accommodating the Tibetan elite of lamas, wealthy
businessmen and high-level cadres. The presence of three banks is also a
sign of profit and prosperity and testifies to the importance of Chengdu
for Tibetan economic life. This place is not a poor ghetto or an enclosed
ethnic enclave on the fringes of the city. Generally speaking, it is a
prosperous commercial space in downtown Chengdu.
We can also learn a lot about this place just by looking at the
storefront signs, advertisements, window displays, colors, and designs.
Although these are material signs of a commercial landscape (discussed
in a later section of the article), they also contribute to a Tibetan ver-
nacular landscape, establishing the neighborhood as a Tibetan place.
Generic Chinese shop names, such as Ethnic Jewelry Shop (Chi.: minzu
jin yin shoushi jingpin dian) and Ethnic Articles Wholesale (Chi.: minzu
yongpin pifa), declare that they deal with “ethnic products” (Chi.: minzu
shangpin) and “religious articles” (Chi.: zongjiao yongpin), although at
times they include specific references to Tibet (Chi.: Xizang). Tibetan
shop names, on the other hand, contain more explicitly Tibetan re-
ferrents, including Tibetan placenames (e.g. Lhasa, Songpan) or simply
Tibet (bod-ljongs); figures or places in Tibetan history and mythology
(e.g. Gesar, Shambala); or words meaning or associated with Tibetan
culture (Tib.: bod-kyi rig-gnas). Very few Tibetan language shop signs
contain a Tibetan equivalent of the Chinese minzu (“ethnic group,”
“nationality,” in Tibetan mi-rigs).
Commercial signage is the most common sign of ethnicization in the
vernacular landscape (cf. Krase and Shortell, 2011: 376). In their for-
mative work establishing LL-research, Landry and Bourhis (1997) single
out two functions of commercial signs, one being to communicate (in-
forming customers where to park, persuading them what to buy) and
the other to symbolize (declaring ownership or dominance by writing in
a particular language or stating affiliation). While they see these signs
as texts that can be read, they pay less attention to the complexity of
their authorship and layers of readings. This complexity is obvious in
several examples from the Tibetan quarter in downtown Chengdu. To
give just one: an attractive sign board outside the store Zhuoma Kitchen
Machines showed a Tibetan woman standing in a landscape of snow-
capped mountains and beautiful green grasslands dotted with dande-
lions and wooden houses – it could be the Swiss Alps, but here it re-
presented Tibet. She promoted a modern butter-tea blender named
Zhuoma (Tib.: Sgrol-ma). It was a Chinese-made product advertised in
Chinese, but given a Tibetan name and a Tibetan face, and equipped
with a slogan: “The bright star that sparkles on the grassland: The
butter-tea machine called Zhuoma.”8 The shop clerk was Han Chinese
and the kitchen machines were produced in a factory in Guangdong
province, which is the origin of an enormous amount of products made
in China meant for both global and local markets. There were three
shops that dealt with kitchen machines, each promoting their brand and
design with a particular Tibetan look. These commercial signs were
meant to persuade the Tibetan consumer to buy the machines as high-
street brands (according to the LL-function to communicate), but si-
multaneously signaled that this neighborhood was indeed a real Tibetan
place (according to the LL-function to symbolize), their effect thus
surpassing the target group (Tibetan consumers). The signs told the
visitor that this was a product that Tibetans needed, and this is where
Tibetans went to get it. These material signs are, therefore, not only
commercial but also constitutive of the vernacular landscape.
Furthermore, the kinds of enterprises and the commodities for sale
at the market communicate the status of the people who are expected to
shop and dwell there. In immigrant neighborhoods in general, we can
expect to find travel agencies, special clothing and beauty services,
foreign grocery stores, as well as communication, money transfer, and
packing services (Krase and Hum, 2007). In the Tibetan quarter, similar
shops signify that this is a place for people belonging to somewhere else
or people on the move. Most Tibetans here are mobile people creating a
mobile, vernacular landscape: the landscape is continuously evolving
according to the stream of Tibetans moving and in and out of the
neighborhood. There are many signs revealing its status as transitional
space, such as the numerous dorms, hostels, guest houses, and hotels
offering accommodation. Strings of SUVs and the occasional lorry are
parked along the streets, some with the driver’s phone number and
maps of the routes they operate plastered on the car windows. They
drive their Tibetan and Chinese customers or goods to Tibetan places:
2000–3000 Yuan for relatively nearby locations in Sichuan, like the
enormous monastic encampments of Yachen and Larung, or
15,000–16,000 Yuan for the long haul over to Lhasa.
These readings of a vernacular landscape, which is one layer in the
6 See Washul (2018) for a discussion of translocal senses of home and the
difference between yul and pha yul.
7 All personal names are pseudonyms.
8 The bi-lingual slogan read in Tibetan: tho-sgang na ‘tsher-ba’i skar-ma ‘od-
chen/ sgrol-ma rtags-can gyi srub-je’i ‘phrul-‘khor/ and in Chinese: caoyuan zhi
xing – zhuoma dianqi. I saw the same advertisement when I visited the shop’s
Barkhor branch in Lhasa.
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multi-modal construction of collective identity, show how, symbolically
at least, this has become a Tibetan place which has even made it on to
the Chengdu city map. By looking at the landscape, we see how
Tibetans have asserted their agency and laid claim to the neighborhood:
the privileged consumer following his heart's desires and the immobile,
marginalized city dweller are social agents as they continuously re-in-
scribe their identity in this place. We see how the authorship of the
vernacular landscape is constituted by an ever-changing body of
Tibetans and non-Tibetans, including both those who signal Tibetan-
ness through clothing, language, bodily practices, and commercial
strategies, and those who read it in the landscape. However, as David
Malinowski (2009: 108) argues, the author of signs is “a complex,
dispersed entity who is only somewhat in control of the meanings that
are read from his or her written ‘utterances.’” Thus her or his display of
agency, materially manifested in the vernacular landscape, has not
overwritten the landscape established and maintained through Party-
state plans and policies and their implementation. It is to a reading of
this political landscape and its entanglement with the Tibetan verna-
cular landscape that I now turn.
3.2. The political landscape
While it is obvious for most visitors that Buddhist statues and
maroon robes are codes for Tibetan-ness, it is the density of Tibetan
clothing, storefronts, quotidian behavior, and religious and food prac-
tices that establishes the ownership of a place (cf. Krase and Shortell,
2011: 373). Because this place is carved into a Han-Chinese city, the
concentration of signs proclaiming Tibetan origin marks the space as
contested: “People lay claim to space as theirs by announcing their
identity in it” (Krase and Shortell, 2011). In terms of the linguistic
environment, the shopkeepers’ signs and the government signage cor-
respond respectively to the categories of bottom-up and top-down signs
that are commonly studied in LL-research (e.g. Ben-Rafael et al. 2006;
Malinowski, 2009). For example, all signage pointing to planned and
organized spaces in the neighborhood marks the neighborhood’s poli-
tical landscape, telling us that this place is subject to management by
Chinese authorities. Whereas Tibetan language has a relatively strong
presence in the vernacular landscape, signage displaying street names
and house numbers, or directing residents and visitors to parking lots,
offices, residential areas, and other formal spaces recognized and
named by local authorities is in Chinese characters only. This brings to
mind Jackson’s comparison of language and landscape: “A landscape,
like language, is the field of perpetual conflict and compromise between
what is established by authority and what the vernacular insists upon
preferring” (Jackson, 1984: 148). At the same time, Chinese-language
signs create corridors or passages through this neighborhood for non-
Tibetan pedestrians for whom this is only a transit-space. By following
the Chinese signs, they need not relate to the Tibetan ownership claims
throughout this part of town, and they can move about the neighbor-
hood without interacting with the surrounding Tibetan culture.
Furthermore, when I say that Chinese signage represents the poli-
tical landscape, I refer to the landscape that was planned to be used by
specific people in specific ways, and which was designed to produce or
educate particular inhabitants of that landscape, like law-abiding and
patriotic citizens, consumers, and minority exemplars. This political
landscape is based upon ideology and is deliberately created according
to a plan: “The political landscape, artificial though it may be, is the
realization of an archetype, of a coherent design inspired by philosophy
or religion, and it has a distinct purpose in view.” (Jackson, 1984: 43).
For example, as related by David Bray (2008: 394), residential com-
pounds in China spatially buttress community values like “‘social co-
hesion’ (ningjuli), ‘neighbourliness’ (linli guanxi), a ‘sense of security’
(anquangan) and a ‘sense of belonging’ (guishugan).”
The political landscape materially manifests the attempts by the
state to regulate this location and is part of this neighborhood’s history.
Migrants and merchants have created a vernacular landscape that the
State has tried to discipline by imposing regulatory material elements in
the landscape, including (but not limited to): signage that gives direc-
tions, and names and categorizes its constituents; administrative units,
such as the TAR government’s Chengdu office; the traffic signal at the
heart of the market; and a massive police presence compared to other
districts in the city. While elements of the political landscape, such as
signage and traffic signals, relate to broader patterns of governance and
governmentality in China, the imposed regulation of the Tibetan
quarter in the form of conspicuous police presence sets it apart as a
Chinese-controlled Tibetan political space. Particularly since the
Tibetan protests in 2008, there has been increased securitization of
Tibetan areas. In Chengdu’s Tibetan quarter, armed police are the most
eye-catching and reminded me of the Barkhor area in Lhasa where the
presence of armed soldiers on rooftops and groups of marching soldiers
expressed the State’s fear of a restive Tibetan population. Similarly, the
intersection that is the center of the Tibetan quarter in Chengdu was
heavily controlled on each of my visits between 2010 and 2019, with
several police installations in place. On the north-western corner of East
Wuhouci Street and Wuhouci Bystreet, a police bus packed with uni-
formed men peeping out from behind closed curtains was parked along
a several-meter-long flower bed that protected one side of the bus. I
read this as a monument to the potential and unlawful separatism that
Tibetans have been negatively labeled with and the security threat they
are perceived to pose. Similarly a police minibus and police guard was
stationed on the opposite side, on the corner of Ximian Qiao Bystreet
and Wuhouci Bystreet. On the main roads stretching out from the in-
tersection in each direction a manned police car waited next to a roped
off police post guarded by a uniformed, stiff-necked policeman holding
a 1.5m-long black stick. Additionally, the occasional police car pa-
trolled the streets. Such a strong police presence is unusual in Chinese
city centers – apart from troubled areas in Tibet and Xinjiang (Fig. 3).
The police were aided by patrols of so-called “volunteers” – a group
of men uniformly dressed in camouflage trousers and t-shirts, equipped
with batons, and wearing alarming red arm-bands printed with white
Chinese characters. They are known in Tibetan as the “Red Armband
Patrols” (Tib.: dpung-rtag dmar-po) and are part of a micro-management
system that collects intelligence and monitors the community. The
presence of a well-equipped police force assisted by baton-swinging,
middle-aged male volunteers, is supposed to have a preventive effect,
mitigating the risk of Tibetans protesting or otherwise causing trouble.
Their visibility and behavior contribute to the creation of a political
landscape, confirming the identity of the quarter as Tibetan territory,
imbued with danger and violence, that needs continuous discipline.
The massive police presence in a geographically small place like
Little Lhasa will, of course, be experienced differently and arouse very
Fig. 3. Politization and enchantment. Buddhism is a dominating theme in the
Tibetan quarter but is disenchanted by the conspicuous police presence.
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different feelings among the people dwelling and visiting there – or it
might not even be noticed. One Tibetan interlocutor, Lhamo, remarked
that regulatory measures like Chinese signage, surveillance, and police
had been normalized in the everyday lives of Tibetans like herself who
frequented the market daily: “We are so used to it that we barely notice
it.” Yet, others will come up with politicized readings of the landscape.
For instance, crowd-stopping barriers in the shape of big flower displays
are perhaps pleasing to look at for the outsider (when they display lush,
green plants, as they sometimes do), but provocative to those among
my Tibetan interlocutors who interpreted this gentrification as a cover-
up for the real purpose, which is to physically restrain the movement of
angry Tibetan crowds (in an imagined, future scenario). Another ex-
ample is the fenced pavement and bike lane that prevents people from
crossing the street other than at designated places. Although fenced
bike lanes are a feature of the political landscape all over urban China,
they can be read differently. They are not generally politicized when
situated in other places, for example in another part of Wuhou district
where I used to live, which was replete with office towers, high-end
shopping, and Euro-American dining for expats and upper-middle class
Chinese. However, in the Tibetan quarter, the population consists of a
continuous flow of people entering and leaving this place, disciplined
by permanent measures displayed in the political landscape in the form
of signage, traffic signals, police posts, and barricades. Here, the aes-
thetics of state control in the form of a flower bed or a fenced bicycle
lane are re-imagined; they become something else that tells us that this
area is considered a politically sensitive and potentially dangerous
place because it is Tibetan.
It is not only the authorities who associate Tibetans with danger and
violence. Concurrent with increasing Chinese interest in Tibetan
Buddhism and the associated shangrila-ization of Tibet, a more negative
image of Tibetans as a people to be disparaged and feared was ex-
acerbated by the circulation of images of attacks on Han Chinese per-
sons and businesses during the 2008 Tibetan demonstrations. Several
Chinese acquaintances advised against going to the Tibetan quarter
after dark, and Chinese cab-drivers warned me that this was a bad
neighborhood as they drove me to my many visits to the market.
According to one taxi driver, the neighborhood’s indigenous Han
Chinese population felt forced to rent out to Tibetans whom they
feared. The Tibetans were driving out the Chinese and colonizing the
place, transforming it into a hotbed for greedy and hot-tempered
Tibetans. He did not like to transport Tibetans and refused to enter their
turf after dark. The quarter has earned itself a bad reputation among a
section of the non-Tibetan population, but it also caters to much more
positive stereotypes that attract many of the people who come to Little
Lhasa to consume – and who thus participate in the creation of a third
dimension of its landscape, entangled with but conceptually distinct
from the vernacular and the political: the commercial landscape.
3.3. Commercial landscape
Although there is a strong commercial dimension to the vernacular
landscape, separate treatment of this commercial dimension helps us to
problematize the close connection between place and identity. By
commercial landscape, I am referring to a landscape that is intended
for, and characteristic of, commerce, rather than using the term in a
metaphorical sense to point to the transactional nature of human re-
lationships and activities in this place. I argue that since the identity of
this place as Tibetan and Buddhist is a valuable resource, its landscape
can also be purposefully created to profit from that image. For instance,
the advertising of the Zhuoma butter-tea blender and Tibetan-language
signs confirm an ethnic authenticity that attracts customers to the
Tibetan quarter, making Tibetan language “an important tool in the
symbolic economy” (Leeman and Modan, 2009: 338) but also a re-
source to tap into for entrepreneurs. Language is commoditized in Little
Lhasa, just like it is in the Chinatown explored by Leeman and Modan
(2009: 333) in Washington DC, which turns the place into “a
commodity, marketing it and the things in it for consumption.” Literacy
in Tibetan is not necessarily important since the aesthetics of Tibetan
letters signal Tibetan identity and attracts customers. For the consumer
who comes here to shop for Tibetan goods but who does not read Ti-
betan, it does not matter if words are misspelled or meaningless as long
as they look Tibetan.
The majority of the goods sold at the market are purportedly con-
nected to Tibetan culture in one of two ways: by appearing as Tibetan or
by appealing to Tibetans (Brox, 2017). Since many Tibetans come to
Chengdu, there is a demand for products favored by them, such as
butter, ceremonial scarves, and prayer flags. Products appealing to Ti-
betans are not necessarily produced in Tibet. They can variously ori-
ginate from, for example, the Kathmandu valley, Zhejiang, Shenzhen,
Beijing, Gansu, Qinghai, and Taiwan. One shop sold expensive Akubra
hats that are particularly popular with wealthy Tibetans. The proprietor
was a Hong Kongese who imported the hats from Australia. His store
was filled with Australian hats, and in the back room was a house altar
with a devotional picture of the Tibetan Buddhist patriarch the 10th
Panchen Lama. While the hats appeal to Tibetan consumer tastes, other
products, such as Buddha statues and carpets, gain their appeal from
their claim to have a Tibetan origin. The target market might be Ti-
betans, non-Tibetans or both. Printing presses, for example, have shops
in the market selling Tibetan Buddhist scriptures, almanacs, poetry, and
dictionaries. These presses are immensely important manufacturers and
mediums of Tibetan culture, and the books end up in Tibet, USA, and
Germany – everywhere where there are Tibetans, Tibetan Buddhists,
Tibet-enthusiasts, and scholars. Other shops appeal to non-Tibetans by
selling accessories, costumes, and religious items with a purported Ti-
betan origin. One tailor shop run by a Han-Chinese couple displayed
minority dresses, including Tibetan outfits. These products appealed to
non-Tibetans for whom they were not clothes, but exotic costumes that
the tailor sold or rented out for costume parties and dance perfor-
mances. Like many other products sold at the market, the dresses were
not Tibetan-made. However, it is obvious that an item does not have to
be made by a Tibetan or in Tibet in order to ‘be Tibetan,’ and more than
half of the shops in the neighborhood were in fact not in Tibetan hands
(Brox, 2017). People sat outside stores packing their goods, some being
carefully placed into nice boxes with the firm's logo, while others were
thrown together in untidy piles. The goods followed old trading routes
and ended up in monastery shops in eastern Tibet or in Lhasa show-
rooms. Other goods entered the circuit of diaspora trade networks op-
erating within global economies and reaching Tibetan communities and
non-Tibetan shops in South Asia, America, and Europe (see Fig. 4).
Many enterprises in this quarter have become so affluent, and the
Fig. 4. Tibetan dress in downtown Chengdu. The Tibetan quarter is a good
place to see Tibetan fashions: both women’s and men’s robes and wide-brimmed
hats are not only worn by people but are also for sale in shops.
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Tibetan atmosphere has grown so strong, that Tibetans are perceived by
their non-Tibetan neighbors as constituting a successful economic col-
lective. The positive stereotypes that brand and attract many non-
Tibetans to the quarter, and which the businesses there prosper from,
are connected to Tibetan religion. The connection that is made between
Tibetans and Buddhism – which is also expressed in the landscape – has
in fact increased the symbolic value of this place, off-setting the nega-
tive image that is communicated by, for instance, the heavy police
presence and cab-drivers’ slander. In particular, Buddhism is a value
that is traded at the market, sought not only by Tibetan visitors but also
non-Tibetans.9 It comes in the form of material culture like statues and
scriptures, but also the value that lies in the promises that are generally
ascribed to Tibetan places; namely the possibility to meet a professional
Tibetan Buddhist who embodies the wisdom that is sought for, or whose
mantras, rituals, blessings, and efficacy can positively affect one’s life
course or business.
The market in Chengdu has evolved into a supply center for the revival
and spread of Tibetan Buddhism among Tibetans since the 1980s and
among Han-Chinese since the 2000s (Caple, 2019, Caple, forthcoming).
General economic growth and people’s strengthened purchasing power
have supported this development. Because the Tibetan quarter has a pro-
minent and prospering commercial strip, it attracts people looking for
profit: not only merchants and entrepreneurs but also entrepreneurial re-
ligious professionals. A few of the non-Tibetan businessmen who have es-
tablished themselves at the market used to have their shops in Lhasa, but
evacuated after 2008 because they felt unsafe, or after 2013 when they
were shut down on government orders due to the Barkhor area being re-
novated. The landscape has become a brand attracting more people who, as
they compete for a share of the market, actively participate in the recrea-
tion of a sensorially “Tibetan” landscape for commercial purposes. In order
to appeal to customers by drawing attention to their goods, many shops not
only sell commodities fitting the image of Little Lhasa but also package
them in enchanting ways that speak to a Tibetan Buddhist aesthetics.
Through their display, branding, and marketing, commodities are staged
within Tibetan Buddhist narratives and values (Brox, 2019). In many shops,
there are heaps of banknotes in the lap of a Buddha statue in meditation
pose, Buddhist chants sound over the loudspeakers, and the smell of in-
cense fills the room. Together with the shopkeeper’s sales pitches and the
promises explicitly laid out in the available marketing material and man-
uals, the commercial landscape is enchanted by transforming commodities
into sacred objects that are ready to be worshipped, be given as offerings,
and be implemented in Buddhist rituals (Brox, 2019). In other words, when
people compete commercially, they also set out to create a landscape that
will pull in customers and increase their profits. One Han Chinese convert
characterized the market as a place where you can hear the sounds of
mantras on the lips of Buddhist customers and non-Buddhist shopkeepers:
“Chanting a mantra is very normal in this area… Even non-Buddhists have
prayer beads; [they] pretend to be a Buddhist… for the purpose of [getting]
more business.” Young Tibetan urbanites I spoke with also talked about the
ways in which non-Buddhist shopkeeper purposefully mimic sacred space
and Buddhist virtues as a commercial strategy. Pema, an entrepreneur in
his twenties had been operating his business from Chengdu for the last four
years, having given up a similar attempt in Guangdong. During a con-
versation in June 2016, I asked him about the piety of the many Han
Chinese shopkeepers who played Buddhist sermons on the loudspeakers
and displayed devotional pictures. He responded by comparing them to
Tibetans who, he said, kept their faith private: “It is true that you can see
some Chinese having devotional pictures and these things, but for Tibetans,
their faith is not superficial… Tibetans have faith, although they perhaps
do not display it by openly praying, or with pictures of their lama. Actually,
Tibetans have a stronger belief than the Han even if they don’t display a
devotional picture there [on the wall]. Many of the Han people do it for
business purposes to attract customers, especially Tibetan customers.”10
This purposefully built element of the landscape, intended for and
characteristic of commerce, is not accounted for in Jackson’s bipartite
distinction between the vernacular landscape, which is the material by-
product of community building, and the political landscape, which is de-
liberately created in order to produce particular inhabitants according to a
political ideal. Yet, this commercial aspect is important. Not only is it
conceptually distinct from the other landscapes, it is prospering from and
dependent upon them. The Tibetan commodities, people, colors, languages,
and so forth that constitute the vernacular landscape appeal to customers
and make them believe that this is an authentic place where one can
purchase real Tibetan commodities. Thus the Tibetan identity of the
landscape, which is reconfirmed in the political landscape, is used as a
resource in the creation of a commercial landscape that appropriates
Tibetan Buddhist aesthetics and profits from the Little Lhasa image. The
place associated with this positive image is distinctive – different from and
in opposition to the rest of a Chinese Chengdu.
4. Conclusion
There is a strong connection in peoples’ minds between people and
places. Despite being a multi-ethnic location, this neighborhood in
Chengdu has evolved into a powerful symbol of one ethnic group, the
Tibetans. Although many Tibetans and Chinese interpret the location as a
Tibetan place, their translations and valuations of it are multifarious. The
neighborhood is a consumer paradise and a money-spinning Tibetan col-
lective, but also a promising market open to non-Tibetan entrepreneurs
with cash and connections. For some people, it is a dangerous place,
threatening and encroaching on its surroundings, and therefore must be
controlled and contained. Yet, for others, the Tibetan quarter is a Buddha-
land: a spiritual gateway offering the possibility to reinsert the Buddhist
sacred into contemporary urban life. What we know or imagine fills this
landscape with meaning, enabling us to interpret what we see. We could
say that we are readers of different texts contained in the landscape, or that
we are all the authors of the multiple texts that shape it. I have asked into
the production of landscapes that have involved the translation of a multi-
ethnic space into a Tibetan place that is set apart from and in opposition to
its Chinese surroundings as a little piece of Tibet in urban China. Engaging
with Jackson’s bipartite theorization of landscape, I have problematized the
boundaries and internal homogeneity of the categories he proposes,
showing how wealth disparities and multi-ethnicity diversify the verna-
cular landscape, and how the political landscape is re-imagined because of
its Tibetan identity and historicity. I have also extended his conceptual
framework by examining how Tibetan aesthetics are appropriated for
commercial purposes. I argue that each of the three landscapes – the ver-
nacular, political, and commercial – works to conjure a Tibetan place in
multi-ethnic urban space.
The economic success of the Tibetan market and, moreover, the
economy of successful domination can be taken as evidence for
Tibetans’ sense of right to belong there. In fact, by 2019, the Tibetan
neighborhood had outgrown the immediate vicinity of the intersection
and the geographical area of the shequ,11 which was recognized as the
Tibetan quarter. It had grown larger and encroached on the neigh-
boring streets, especially to the south of the market where Tibetan
enterprises, restaurants, and nightclubs had mushroomed. Chime, a
Tibetan entrepreneur in his early thirties, told me that he felt very
9 Shopkeepers selling Buddhist commodities at the market, whom I have
talked to, estimated that between 50 and 60 percent of the customers were
Tibetan and the rest Han-Chinese, and guessed that 80 percent were Buddhists.
10 The overarching Buddhist theme of the commercial landscape is an im-
portant but too complex issue to unpack here. I intend to explore it in detail in a
future article, “The aesthetics of in/authenticity,” that will delve into how the
Tibetan quarter is seen as endangering and compromising Buddhist virtues
because Buddhism is sold for profit.
11 The Chinese term shequ (“community”) designates the basic territorial and
administrative unit of urban governance (Bray, 2008: 398).
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proud of the Tibetan quarter in Chengdu. Despite all the pressure that
the Chinese State had subjected Tibetans too, Tibetans had been able to
develop their own place on foreign ground, which everybody re-
cognized as a Tibetan place. Sitting in a café south of the market one
evening in June 2016, Chime told me:
Actually, I am very proud of seeing the Tibetan market. Because,
you know, Tibetans are not supposed to be there and to have such a
big place, but they have been staying there for many years….I heard
that many years ago, the government tried to destroy the market
and send the Tibetan people to another place, some rural part of the
city. But, you know, they are still there [in the city center].
Chime related how Tibetans were invading the surrounding blocks,
transforming a part of Chengdu’s city center into a Tibetan neighbor-
hood with its Tibetan language, symbols, scents, food preferences, and
music. It was no longer strange to meet Tibetan monks in the nearby
Walmart or hear the Tibetan language spoken at the neighboring table
at a local restaurant where the menu was in English and Chinese. For
Chime, this represented a kind of victory: a material and living proof of
the Tibetans occupying a little piece of China. Chime argued that the
government had lost the struggle to relocate the Tibetans to some re-
mote corner of the city. The Tibetans had won and had even burst the
officially defined administrative boundaries of the neighborhood and
encroached on the surroundings. Tibetans dominated. Yet, during my
latest visit to the market in January 2019, I learned that the story about
forced relocation had resurfaced. There were rumors that the neigh-
borhood faced imminent demolition to make way for a magnificent
theme park.12 Some people with whom I spoke seemed to meet pre-
carity with refusal, either by celebrating the illusion of certainty (as
Chime had done in 2016) or by incorporating the looming threat of
demolition into a positive narrative about their personal futures – it
was, in any case, time for them to retire. Others were anxious when
faced with unsettling rumors about new State measures to discipline
Tibetans, or when seeing that neighboring shops had to close because
they were not able to renew their leases. Like the American trailer parks
and shanty towns described by Jackson, the Tibetan quarter of Chengdu
was characterized by insecurity, uncertainty and temporality, its sur-
vival subject to the leniency of the local government and changing
political winds. What Chime interpreted as a triumph was also an index
of political precarity, signaling the ongoing struggle for authorship and
ownership of this little piece of China’s urban space.
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